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Counterclaim in Montana
David R. Mason*
I. HISTORY OF THE STATUTES AND THEIR
PROVISIONS
The principle that a man should not be compelled to pay
one moment what he will be entitled to recover back the next
moment is today well entrenched in legal theory. However,
this principle was slow in developing,' and its procedural rec-
ognition in Montana, as in a majority of the states of the Unit-
ed States, is somewhere between that of the first quarter of the
nineteenth century and the more advanced procedure of today.
Originally the common law acknowledged no defense or
proceeding on the part of a defendant in the nature of a cross-
demand, the primitive notion of an action not admitting the
possibility of a defendant's being an actor and interposing a
claim against the plaintiff in the one suit.' But, between the
fourteenth and sixteenth centuries the term "recouper" ap-
peared and there developed a legal doctrine of recoupment,
that the defendant was entitled to show that the plaintiff had
not sustained damages to the extent alleged, and thus reduce
or even defeat the plaintiff's recovery In the early period
of this development, this right of a defendant to recoupment
was of very limited application, and could only be resorted to
when the defendant insisted upon a deduction from the plain-
tiff's demand arising from payment in whole or in part, or re-
covery, or some analogous fact.' It was not until the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century that recoupment became recog-
nized as proper when the defendant was claiming damages
from the plaintiff either because he had not complied with
some cross-obligation of the contract upon which he sued, or
because he had violated some duty which the law imposed upon
him in the making or performance of that contract."
Some cases are to be found implying that recoupment
might be had at common law for damages connected with the
subject matter or transaction upon which the suit was brought,
but which did not constitute a violation of any duty imposed
by law in the making or performance of the contract sued
upon. However, apparently they were decided with reference
to statutory counterclaim.' It seems that recoupment as it was
*Professor of Law, Montana State University.
'Loyd, The Development of Set-off, 64 UNIv. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916).
2PoMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §605.
83 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912), §1034.
'SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, OP. Cit., §1035.
'Loyd, The Development of Set-off, op. oit., note 1, at p. 545.
'3 BouvER's LAW DICTIONARY (Rawle's 3rd rev. 1914), p. 2849.
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known at common law was not only confined to a claim con-
nected with the subject matter or transaction sued upon, but
it was necessary that that claim originate in a contract.
Equity, under certain circumstances, at an early date al-
lowed the set-off of claims which did not arise out of the trans-
action sued upon by the plaintiff or which were not connected
with the subject matter thereof;" but it took legislation to es-
tablish such a right in a defendant at law, and after the pas-
sage of the set-off statutes equity confined the use of set-off to
circumstances where it was permitted by the codes, except
where special equitable grounds for relief were shown.!
For example, where mutual credits existed, or where the plaintiff was
insolvent or had acted fraudulently; and where one joint debtor was
surety for the other, he was allowed in equity to set-off debts due his
principal from the plaintiff-creditor. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p.
438; see generally, 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918),
§ §1865 -1886.
That equitable set-off today rests largely in the discretion of the
court, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 439, note 17.
Also in equity, cross-bills by a defendant against a plaintiff in the
same suit, or against other defendants in the same suit, or against both,
were recognized to give full relief to all the parties. However, these
cross-bilis were not permitted to introduce new and distinct matters
not embraced in the original suit, but were treated as mere auxiliary
suits, or as dependencies upon the original suit. STONY, EQUITY PLEAD-
ING (9th ed. 1879), § §389, 392, 395, 398, 399, 401.
83 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918), §1872, p. 473, note 2,
§1875. O'. Wells v. Clarsson (1874) 2 Mont. 230, rehearing den., p.
379 (1876) : In holding that plaintiff could maintain an action to set
off a judgment, which he held against defendant, against a judgment
obtained by defendant against plaintiff and which had been assigned,
the court said, at pp. 231, 232:
"... The action in which Clarkson obtained his judgment was
for unuquidated damages. In that case the plaintiff had no power
to set up its claim as a defense. A set-off can be set up only when
both demands are choses in action.
"As soon as Clarkson obtained his judgment, it then became a
chose in action, and the rule undoubtedly is In an action in equity,
that as Clarkson was insolvent the plaintiff had a right to have his
demand set off against Clarkson's judgment. This has been termed
a natural equity ....
"The statutes of this Territory provide that the assignment of
a thing In action shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other
defense at the time of or before notice of the assignment. See Laws
of Montana Territory for 1871 - 2, p. 28, §5 .... There might be
some doubt as to whether this statute referred to any thing more
than a right to set up a set-off or counter-claim upon an action on
a chose in action ....
"It may be observed, however, that equity follows the law, and
that this statute defines the legal status of the assignee."
Of. also Stadler v. First National Bank (1889) 22 Mont. 190, 56 P.
111, 74 Am. St. Rep. 582.
It is not the purpose of this article to treat the substantive rights
of an assignee. As to that: RESTATEMENT, CONTRACT, MONT. ANNoT.,
§167.
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In the enactment of set-off statutes, providing generally
for the set-off of debts, it is interesting to note that several of
the American colonies were in advance of the mother country :
a Virginia statute of 1645 was apparently the first of its
kind ;" Pennsylvania in 1682 at its first assembly passed such a
statute ;' in 1714 New York passed an act apparently derived
from the Pennsylvania act;' and in 1722 New Jersey adopted
a statute the text of which followed rather closely the language
of the New York act.' The first English act was enacted in
1729, was made perpetual in 1735,'" and was adopted in sub-
stance by many of the United States."
Under the English statute of 1729 and its American coun-
terparts it was necessary that the demands be due the defend-
ant in his own right as against the plaintiff, or his assignor,
and be not already barred by the statute of limitations but ex-
isting and belonging to the defendant at the time of the com-
mencement of the action." Also, these statutes permitted the
set-off only of "debts", so it was necessary that the claims of
both plaintiff and defendant be liquidated;" and a defendant
was not entitled to a judgment against a plaintiff for any ex-
cess over the plaintiff's demand which he migh prove. As was
stated by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in Stooke v. Taylor:"
"By the statute of set-off this plea is available only
where the claims of both sides are in respect of liquidated
debts, or money demands which can be readily and with-
out difficulty ascertained. The plea can only be used in
the way of defense to the plaintiff's action, as a shield,
not as a sword. Though the defendant succeeded in prov-
ing a debt exceeding the plaintiff's demand, he was not
entitled to recover the excess; the effect was only to defeat
the defendant's action, the same as though the debt had
been equal to the amount of the claim established and no
more."
Thus recoupment was confined to actions upon contracts,
and itself had to arise from contract; the set-off of English
'For a review of the statutes, see Loyd, The Development of Set-off,
op. cit., note 1.'February 17, 1644 - 5, 1 HENING's LAWS 294.
uCHARTER AND LAws OF PENNA., 118.
'2Act of 1714, BRADFORD's LAWS (1726), p. 93.
"LAws OF Nnw JERsEY (ed. of 1752), p. 98; ALurNsoN's LAWS OF N. J.
(1776), p. 66.
"2 GEO. II, ch. 22, §13.
58 GEo. II, ch. 24, §5.
"Loyd, The Development of Set-off, op. cit., note 1, at p. 551.
17CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), pp. 438, 439.
"POMEROY, CODE REmErIES (5th ed. 1929), §607; cf. Wells v. Clarkson,
supra, note 8; Stadler v. First National Bank, supra, note 8.
-(1880) 5 Q. B. D. 569, 575.
3
Mason: Counterclaim in Montana
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1942
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
origin was confined to actions upon contracts or debts and had
to arise from contract or debt; and, just as at common law the
force of the remedy of recoupment was spent in the discount
or abatement of the plaintiff's claim, either partially or whol-
ly, so too a defendant invoking the English statutory set-off
could only reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recovery."
However, the defenses of recoupment and set-off under
the English act were not compulsory but of choice, and a de-
fendant could at his option resort to an independent action and
so obtain an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff. The
New Jersey statute of 1722 was an exception to the rule, and
required that the defendant plead his set-off, "or else forever
after be barred of bringing any action for that which he might
or ought to have pleaded by virtue of this act." But, this was
an unusually stringent rule, and in most American states set-
off was optional, not compulsory.'
The situation prior to the codes of civil procedure has been
summarized as follows :'
"By the first quarter of the nineteenth century it may
be said that through statutes, and in some instances the
liberal construction of such statutes, the principle has de-
veloped to this extent; the right to plead and prove a
counter demand, growing out of an independent transac-
tion for which an action might be maintained by the de-
fendant, as an offset to defeat the plaintiff's recovery in
whole or part, is generally recognized, and in some states,
an affirmative judgment for the defendant is permitted.
Under all the statutes liquidated demands can be set off
and, very generally, the right is restricted to such de-
mands. Some statutes are so construed as to allow unliqui-
dated claims arising out of contract to be set off, but upon
this subject there is regrettable confusion, depending as
the cases do, partly on the interpretation of the respective
acts and partly on the policy of the courts in enlarging or
restricting the right. Limited by statute to actions upon
debts and contracts, the almost universal rule is not to per-
mit set-offs in tort actions, and, in a similar manner, in
contract actions to disallow set-offs arising out of torts.
Recoupment, on the other hand, although frequently con-
fused with set-off, is recognized as a distinct principle,
namely, the right to present in opposition to the plaintiff's
'Tlne first statute permitting affirmative relief to a defendant for the
excess of his claim over the plaintiff's demand seems to have been a
Pennsylvania statute of 1705 - 6, passed after the rejection by the
queen in council of the earlier Pennsylvania act. 2 STAT. AT LARGE
PENNA. 241; 2 P. & L. DiG. (2 ed.) 2844.
t Loyd, The Development of Set-off, op. cit., note 1, at p. 560.
OLoyd, The Development of Set-off. op. cit., note 1, at pp. 562, 563.
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claim, for its reduction or extinguishment, a right of action
in the defendant for loss or damage sustained by him in
the same transaction through breach of contract or duty
on the part of the plaintiff."
With the adoption of codes of civil procedure these earlier
devices to permit a defendant to interpose cross-claims were dis-
placed by the "counterclaim," which first appeared in the
amendments of the New York Code of 1852." In Montana, the
common law system of procedure was never in force. The first
legislative assembly of the territory adopted a code of civil
procedure abolishing the distinction between suits in equity
and actions at law,' and defining the defense of "counter-
claim." This definition was as follows:
"The counterclaim ... shall be one existing in favor
of the defendant, and against the plaintiff, between whom
a several judgment might be had in the action, and aris-
ing out of one of the following causes of action: First, a
cause of action arising out of the transaction set forth in
the complaint ... as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim
• . .connected with the subject matter. Second, in an ac-
tion arising on contract, any other cause of action arising
on contract, and existing at the commencement of the
suit. ',
This statute was not substantially changed until 1895,"
when a new statute, apparently following the language of the
New York act, ' was enacted. The definition in the statute of
1895 has remained unchanged to this day. It is as follows:
"The counterclaim, specified in the last section, must
tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's re-
covery, and must be one of the following causes of action
against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the per-
"Act of April 16, 1852, LAWS OF N. Y., ch. 392, pp. 654, 149, 150.
"BANNACK STAT., §1, p. 43; R. C. M. 1935, §9008.
'BANNACK STAT., §47, p. 52.
"Amendment of 1867 (§47, p. 143, LAWS OF MONTANA) added language
to make consistent provision for counterclaim by way of reply, which
was permitted until 1895, and also made some changes in punctuation;
amendment of 1877 (§88, p. 61, LAWS OF MONTANA) inserted the word
"or" before "connected with the subject matter."
'In Stadler v. First National Bank, supra, note 8, the court said, at p.
211 of 22 Mont: "Subdivision 1 of section 692 Is, in substance subdi-
vision 8 of section 18, at page 366, of the Revised Statutes of New York
of 1867; in force in that state ever since the year 1847, and perhaps
from an earlier date. Said subdivision 1 is a copy of subdivision 1 of
section 502 of Throop's Annotated Code of Civil Procedure of New
York of 1888, and is also identical with subdivision 1 of section 502
of Stover's New York Annotated Code of Civil Procedure of 1897."
However, the counterclaim provision was not contained in the original
New York codes of 1848 and 1849; it first appeared in the amendments
of 1852. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 439.
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son he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or one or
more defendants, between whom and the plaintiff a sep-
arate judgment may be had in the action:
"1. A cause of action arising out of the contract or
transaction, set forth in the complaint, as the foundation
of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of
the action.
"2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action
on contract, existing at the commencement of the ac-
tion."
Two differences are to be observed between the definition
prior to 1895 and that subsequent thereto. First, after 1895 a
requisite of the counterclaim is that it tend, in some way, to
diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery; and second, after
1895 the first subdivision contains the words "contract or" be-
fore the word "transaction." The express requirement that
the counterclaim must tend in some way to diminish or defeat
the plaintiff's recovery is also found in the Indiana code," was
contained in the New York code' until 1936' and was added to
the California code in 1927.' However, regardless of such a
statute the courts have generally applied such a rule, and have
refused to uphold counterclaims unless they meet squarely the
judgment the plaintiff claims.' It is not difficult to detect the
influence of common law recoupment in such a requirement.
The second change effected in 1895 made it clear that it
is not necessary that the counterclaim of the defendant arise
out of contract. In Scott v. Waggoner, the Supreme Court of
Montana said:
". .. Subdivision 1, above quoted, specifies three
things as possible basis of counterclaim; viz., the contract
sued on, the transaction set forth, and the subject of the
action. Either these things are different and distinct, or
the provision is 'a misleading tautology' .
" The statute then in force (codified statutes 1871-
"C. CIv. PRoc. 1895, §691; R. C. M. 1935, §9138. In justices' courts, un-
der R. C. M. 1935, §9642, the only limitation upon the defense of coun-
ter-claim is that it must be one upon which an action might be brought
by the defendant against the plaintiff in a justices' court. Walter v.
Cox (1907) 36 Mont. 20, 91 P. 1063.
"IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns 1933), §2 - 1018.
$ON. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (1921), §266.
"N. Y. LAWS OF 1936, ch. 324; CAHmLS N. Y. Civ. PRAc. (7th ed.) §266.
The following advanced statute was enacted: "A counterclaim may be
any cause of action in favor of the defendants or some of them against
the plaintiffs or some of them, a person whom a plaintiff represents
or a plaintiff and other person or persons adjudged to be liable."
_aTATS. & AMDTs. (1927), p. 1620.
'CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 448.
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72) authorized a counterclaim which consisted of 'a cause
of action arising out of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint', etc., as distinguished from our present provision
that a counterclaim may consist of 'a cause of action arising
out of the contract or transaction', etc. Whatever reason
there might have been, under the statute and under the au-
thorities as they then stood, for construing the term 'tran-
saction' as synonymous with 'contract' can have no effect
upon the clear implication of the present law that they are
not synonymous.'
The Montana code also contains a provision, apparently
taken from California,' for compulsory counterclaim, if it is
within the first subdivision of the statute defining counterclaim.
It is provided:
"If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim in
the cases mentioned in the first subdivision of section 9138,
neither he nor his assignee can afterwards maintain an ac-
tion against the plaintiff therefor."
It is obvious that the code counterclaim is broader than re-
coupment and set-off, although it includes both." Under the
statutory counterclaim the defendant may recover an affirma-
tive judgment, and it is not necessary that the plaintiff's claim
be liquidated, or that it arise out of debt or contract.
No doubt the purpose sought to be accomplished by counter-
claim statutes was not only to do justice to defendants, but
also to avoid a multiplicity of suits and save public expense.'
Nevertheless, there is a survival of the doctrines of recoup-
ment and set-off in the requirements that the counterclaim
must tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's cause of action,
that it must be a cause of action against the plaintiff and in
favor of a defendant between whom and the plaintiff a sep-
" (1914) 48 Mont. 536, 544, 547, 139 P. 454, L. R. A. 1916C 491.
5CALIF. C. Civ. PRoc. (1872), §439. The codes of Nevada and Utah con-
tain similar provisions. Nav. CoMP. LAws (1929), §8604; REV. STATS.
OF UTAH (1933), §104 - 9 - 3. Under some codes, if a defendant fails
to set up a counterclaim he can't recover costs in any subsequent action
thereon. IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933), §2 - 1019; Nan. CoMP. STAT.
(1929) §20 - 814; OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, Lifetime ed.) §11624.
-R. C. M. 1935, §9144. And see also R. C. M. 1935, §9643, applying to prac-
tice before a Justice of the peace. Where no such statute exists, the de-
fendant has the option of filing a counterclaim or bringing an inde-
pendent action, CLARK, CODE PLEAD NG (1928), pp. 446, 447.
"PoMEROy, CODE RPEmEIEs (5th ed. 1929), §§611, 612. See also Galiger
v. McNulty (1927) 80 Mont. 339, 360, 260 P. 401. But cf. Apple v. Ed-
wards, infra, note 101, where the court stated that the affirmative mat-
ter did not, strictly speaking, amount to a counterclaim, but that the
Hen could be enforced by recoupment.
For statements of Montana court as to the purpose of the counterclaim
statute, see State v. Waggoner, supra, note 34, 48 Mont. at p. 543;
Friedrichsen v. Cobb (1929) 84 Mont. 238, 250, 275 P. 267.
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arate judgment may be had, that, except when both the action
and the counterclaim are in contract, it arise out of the tran-
saction set forth in the complaint or be connected with the sub-
ject matter thereof, and that it be in existence at the time of
the commencement of the suit.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1. The Pleading of a Counterclaim as a Cause of Action
The defenses of recoupment and set-off at common law
were essentially causes of action which admitted the plaintiff's
cause of action and set up affirmative cross-demands, as dis-
tinct from true defenses which simply attacked the plaintiff's
cause of action and showed that by virtue thereof the plaintiff
ought not to recover either at all or all that he demanded.'
Likewise, the code counterclaim does not comprehend facts
pleaded merely in bar of plaintiff's action," and allegations
which can be proved under denials are not proper in a counter-
claim.'"
The code defines the counterclaim as a "cause of action";4
provides that a defendant may set forth as many defenses or
counterclaims, or both, as he has, but that each defense or
counterclaim must be separately stated and numbered;" and
that where the defendant deems himself entitled to an affirm-
ative judgment against the plaintiff by reason of his counter-
claim, he must demand the judgment in his answer."
The counterclaim, being a cause of action, the defendant in
pleading it' occupies the position of a plaintiff in stating a
cause of action. Thus, in Babcock v. Maxwell, it was said, with
reference to the matter alleged in an answer:
". .. Unless the matter alleged, taken by itself, and
without reference to the complaint, would, if proved, en-
title defendant to judgment against the plaintiff, a count-
erclaim is not pleaded; that is to say, a counterclaim is a
cause of action existing in favor of defendant, and against
the plaintiff, and must therefore contain a statement of
such facts as would be requisite to the sufficiency of a
complaint, and must, in stating a cause of action, be com-
plete within itself.""
mPommoY, CoDE Rm-noEmI (5th ed. 1929), §609.
"OBabcock v. Maxwell (1898) 21 Mont. 507, 54 P. 943.
"Word v. Moore (1923) 66 Mont. 550, 214 P. 79.
"R. C. M. 1935, §9138.
-R. C. M. 1935, §9146.
"R. C. M. 1935, §9148.
"'The furnishing of a bill of particulars does not constitute a plead-
ing satisfying the requirement that a counterclaim be pleaded. Do-
lenty v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. (1910) 41 Mont. 105, 115,
108 P. 921.
"Supra, note 40, 21 Mont. at p. 512.
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Again, in Galland v. Galland, the court said:
"As to the allegations of his counterclaim the de-
fendant, in effect, became a plaintiff, and whether his
pleading states facts sufficient to entitle him to affirma-
tive relief against the plaintiff is determined by the same
rules which would be applied to it as an original complaint
, ,47
The test, then, of the sufficiency of a counterclaim is
whether the facts which it sets up, if admitted to be true,
would entitle the defendant to a judgment in his favor against
the plaintiff."8 Failure of the allegations of answers to meas-
ure up to this simple rule has resulted in their failure as coun-
terclaims in a number of Montana cases.'
The counterclaim being a cause of action, where a defend-
ant in his counterclaim seeks an affirmative judgment against
the plaintiff, the issues arising on the counterclaim are triable
as if they arose in an action brought by the defendant against
the plaintiff. The importance of this is illustrated by Conti-
nental Oil Co. v. Bell. The plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover the balance due on account for gasoline sold and de-
livered to the defendants. The defendants filed counterclaims,
asserting that they were entitled to certain refunds on gasoline
purchased during the year 1929 in excess of the amount due the
plaintiff, relying upon oral agreements, and seeking affirma-
tive judgment in their favor. The plaintiff, by its reply as a
defense to the counterclaims, pleaded written agreements of
sale covering the price to be paid. The defendants' testimony,
tending to prove an oral contract to refund portions of the pur-
chase price, was objected to as within the inhibition of the pa-
rol evidence rule. The defendants contended that an excep-
tion to the parol evidence rule applied, because the written
agreements were only collaterally in issue. In holding that
the evidence was within the inhibition of the parol evidence
rule, the court said:
"... Defendants assert the only issues in the case are
those made up by the complaint and the answer; but such
is an erroneous construction in view of the fact that where
counterclaims are involved and an affirmative judgment
is sought against the plaintiff, the issues arising on the
4(1924) 70 Mont. 513, 515, 226 P. 511."sSee POMEROY, CODE R EDEmis (5th ed. 1929), §614.
"Erbes v. Smith (1907) 35 Mont. 38, 88 P. 568; Meredith v. Roman
(1914) 49 Mont. 204, 141 P. 643; Hillman v. Luzon Cafe Co. (1914) 49
Mont. 180, 142 P. 641; Word v. Moore, 8upra, note 41; Broat Lumber
Co. v. Van Houten (1923) 66 Mont. 478, 213 P. 1116; Lappin v. Martin
(1924) 71 Mont. 233, 228 P. 763.
9
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counterclaims are triable as if they arose in an action
brought by the defendants against the plaintiff (section
9329, Rev. Codes 1921.) Therefore, in determining the ap-
plication of this exception to the rule on which defendants
rely, the issues which were being tried are those arising on
the counterclaim and reply. ... "
Again, the character of a counterclaim as a cause of action
has affected the burden of proof, because, in general, the party
who must affirmatively plead a particular matter also has the
burden of proving it.' And, a counterclaim being subject to
the same general rules of pleading as is a complaint, the doc-
trine of aider is applicable.'
A question has arisen as to whether the distinctions be-
tween defenses and counterclaims must be formally observed
by denominating a counterclaim as such. In Lappin v. Mar-
tin, the court, as one reason for its position that the answer
did not state a counterclaim, said: "The matter alleged ... is
designated as an affirmative defense and further answer,
whereas a counterclaim should be pleaded as such." As au-
thority for this statement, the court cited Babcock v. Maxwelt.
In the Babcock case, the court took the position that the coun-
terclaim should be labeled as such, because, under the statute
then applicable, the requirement of a reply to avoid the admis-
sion as true of averments of facts in an answer extended only
to counterclaims. The court said:
"... Defendant having characterized his pleading as
a defense, is bound by the choice he makes, and may not
afterwards be heard to assert that it is a counterclaim.
... A counterclaim must be described as such where the
question turns on the want of a reply. 'Such a rule is es-
sential to protect a plaintiff from being misled by an an-
swer, and to prevent the snare of a counterclaim lurking
(1933) 94 Mont. 123, 132, 21 P. (2d) 65.
"in Yancey v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (1910) 42 Mont. 342, 112 P. 533,
the counterclaim was on an implied promise to pay for goods taken
from defendant and converted by plaintiff's assignor. The court said
that the allegation of non-payment in the counterclaim was a material
one, and therefore, the burden of proving the same rested upon the
defendant. See also Dick v. King (1925) 73 Mont. 456, 236 P. 1093.
Defendant counterclaimed for compensation due for the sale of real
estate belonging to plaintiff. Evidence introduced In support of the
counterclaim was properly stricken, because it disclosed that the en-
tire transaction was in parol.
52See Galland v. Galland, supra, note 47. Although the counterclaim
was technically defective, yet since it stated the jurisdictional facts,
it would be considered as having been amended by the findings of the
jury which were adopted by the court.
'Supra, note 49, 71 Mont. at p. 239.
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 3 [1942], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/12
COUNTERCLAIM IN MONTANA
under the cover of a supposed defense, and unconsciously
admitted by failure to reply'."d
It certainly is often difficult to distinguish an affirmative
defense from a counterclaim, ' and the position taken in the
Babcock case seems to be sound. However, the statutes had
been amended by the time of the decision in Lappin v. Martin,
so that an answer containing either a counterclaim or any new
matter necessitated a reply to avoid admission of the facts
therein alleged. ' The statement in the Lappin case seems to
have overlooked the fact that the reason for the holding in the
Babcock case no longer existed.
Under the Montana statutes, which require a reply to any
defense other than a general or specific denial, it is difficult
to see how a plaintiff can be trapped into unconsciously admit-
ting the allegations of any answer by reason of its label or lack
of label. No literal denial requires a reply; and all affirmative
allegations properly so pleaded do require a reply. Of course,
a plaintiff may be in doubt as to whether facts affirmatively
alleged in an answer are properly so pleaded, or whether they
would be admissible under denials, and therefore may be in
doubt as to whether a reply is necessary;" but that doubt
would not be removed by any label placed upon the allega-
tions. Really, from the fact that the matter is alleged affirma-
tively, there is an implied label of the allegations as either
counterclaim or new matter, and a reply is necessary to avoid
admission if the allegations be either. Therefore, although
it is true that some authority may be found for the proposition
that a counterclaim must be designated as such, irrespective of
the necessity for a reply, ' it would seem that there is no longer
good reason for such a requirement. Such a requirement places
a considerable burden on a defendant of making a decision at
his peril as to whether he has an affirmative defense or a
"Supra, note 40, 21 Mont. at p. 514.
"Particularly Is this true of so-called equitable defenses, for discussion
of which see Hinton, Equitable Defenses Under Modlern Codes, 18
MIcH. L. REv. 717 (1926) ; Cook, Equ-itable Defenses, 32 YALE L. J
645 (1923).
"§§1 and 2, pp. 131 and 132, LAws OF MONTANA 1899, amending C. Civ.
PRoc. 1895, §§720 and 722. Such is the law today. R. C. M. 1935,
§§9158, 9160.
'In Doichinoff v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1916) 51 Mont. 582,
154 P. 924, the court held that facts alleged in an answer denominated
"Special and Affirmative Answer and Defense," were not admitted
by failure to reply, because the facts could have been proved under
a general denial.
'See discussion and citation of authorities in PoMEnoY, CODE RMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929), §624; CLARK, CODE PLFADING (1928), pp. 442-4.
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counterclaim, a burden which is not necessary for the protec-
tion of the plaintiff. Whether a counterclaim is sufficient
should depend on the substance of its allegations, and not upon
the defendant's conclusion, evidenced by the label which he
places upon it, as to its legal character.'
Of course, counterclaims must be pleaded in suits in equity
as well as in actions at law.' Also the requirement that each
defense and counterclaim be separately stated and numbered
obtains in equity.' However, there are some Montana cases
containing language perhaps indicating that the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to counterclaims do
not apply in equity. In Davis v. Davis, the plaintiff brought
suit to annul certain conveyances. It appears that a defendant,
an attorney in fact for the plaintiff, conveyed by virtue of such
agency certain property belonging to the plaintiff to his co-de-
fendant, who in turn reconveyed it to the defendant. The de-
fendant pleaded as a separate defense that the premises were
purchased by the plaintiff, the defendant and another; that
the defendant supplied the money to pay for his share; that
the deed was taken in the name of the plaintiff alone; that at
the time of and prior to the acts complained of, the legal title
to such share was in the plaintiff, but there was a resulting
trust in favor of the defendant, and that the defendant had an
equitable title to said share in the premises when the power of
attorney was made to him; and prayed that the defendant be
discharged. The court said that, under the rules of practice
in a court of equity, the court will hear an equitable defense
or counterclaim, connected with the subject matter of the peti-
tion, without regard to the provisions of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure; and held that the new matter was properly pleaded as
a defense, and that the prayer that the defendant be discharged
did not conclude the pleader, but that the court could enter
'In Guthrie v. Holloran (1931) 90 Mont. 373, 3 P. (2d) 406, the court
had no difficulty in treating as a cross-complaint an answer denom-
inated a counterclaim, and it would seem that it should have no more
difficulty in treating a pleading denominated an affirmative defense,
or one without denomination, as a counterclaim. Cf. also, Callender
V. Crossfield Oil Syndicate (1929) 84 Mont. 263, 275 P. 273: In equity
the denomination of an answer as a "further answer and separate
defense" does not prevent its being considered as a cross-complaint.
And see FEERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rule 8(c) : ". . . When a
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation."
0OUnion Mercantile Co. v. Jacobs, Sulton & Co. (1897) 20 Mont. 270, 554,
50 P. 793, 52 P. 375. See also Galiger v. McNulty, supra, note 37;
Erbes v. Smith, supra, note 49.'Flatt v. Norman (1932) 91 Mont. 543, 11 P. (2d) 798.
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a decree adjudging the title to be in the defendant, if it deemed
that the dismissal of the action was not sufficient confirmation
of his title.'
In Anaconda Mining Co. v. Thomas, in a suit to quiet title,
the answer contained a "further and separate answer and de-
fense," setting up title by prescription and praying that the
plaintiff take nothing and that the defendant have his costs.
The court entered judgment on the pleadings for the defend-
ant, and in the judgment decreed that the plaintiff take noth-
ing by its action; that the defendant have his costs; and that
the claim of the defendant to the premises "shall be and is
hereby declared to be established, and ... that the title to and
the right of possession ... shall be and the same is hereby for-
ever quieted in and to the defendant . . . as against the claim
of the plaintiff." The Supreme Court held that the new matter
set up in the answer was sufficient to support the decree, say-
ing:
If the action were at law, the want of counter-
claim complete within itself would be fatal; but the action
is in equity, and the pleader is not concluded by his prayer
... nor by the form of his pleading.... "
In Pittsmont Copper Co. v. O'Rourke, in a suit to enjoin
the sale of certain real property in execution of a judgment,
the court held that a"further answer and counterclaim,"
praying for various affirmative remedies and also for general
relief, was sufficient to warrant denial of relief to the plain-
tiff, and said:
"... We do not deem it of importance to ascertain
whether the 'further answer' states a counterclaim, strict-
ly so called, with all the precision requisite in an action at
law. The present proceeding is in equity, and the matter
set forth in the 'further answer' cannot be ignored if it is
sufficient in substance to warrant denial of relief to the
plaintiff or to require the imposition of conditions to the
granting of the same....
"The answer states an equitable defense; but, unless
there is a defect in parties, it has other and larger conse-
quences. In a suit in equity the mere pleading of an equit-
able defense, as such, will authorize the granting of what-
ever affirmative relief the party shows himself entitled to,
consistent with his pleadings and without regard to his
prayer. This is under the rule that when a court of equity
2(1890) 9 Mont. 267, 23 P. 715.
6(1913) 48 Mont. 222, 225, 137 P. 380.
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has before it all the parties to any difference, and when
it has obtained complete jurisdiction of the subject matter,
it will finally settle the whole controversy.... "
If the court in the Davis, Thomas and O'Rourke cases
meant to hold that the provisions of the Code of Civil Proced-
ure with respect to the manner of pleading counterclaims have
no application in equity, and that it is not necessary that a
counterclaim in equity state a cause of action complete within
itself, such holdings are inconsistent with a fundamental prin-
ciple of the codes of civil procedure, for the fusion of law and
equity was a fundamental principle of code reform.' However,
in spite of the breadth of language used, it would seem that all
the court actually held in those cases was that the prayer for
relief was not essential to the counterclaims, and that the de-
fendants were entitled to any relief to which the facts stated
in the counterclaims showed them to be entitled, irrespective
of the prayer.'
"(1914) 49 Mont. 281, 291, 293, 141 P. 849.
"Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1925);
Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 66 U. PA. L. Rv. 17 (1917);
Taylor, Law Reform, 11 ILL. L. Rv. 402 (1917); POMF2OY, CODE
R~mms (5th ed. 1929) §§4 to 15, incl.
'Some of the language in Galger v. McNulty, supra., note 37, seems to
be inconsistent with such holding. In that case, the court said, at
pp. 360, 361 of 80 Mont.:
"In pleadings in equity, as stated by Blackstone, the rule was:
'A defendant cannot pray anything in this, his answer, but to be
dismissed the court, and, if he has any relief to pray against the
plaintiff, he must do it by an original bill of his own, which is
called a cross-bill.' (2 Cooley's Blackstone, 3d ed., book 3, star
page 448.)
"The terms 'set-off' and 'recoupment' are by some authorities
ncluded in the term 'counterclaim.' (St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay,
101 CaL 286, 35 Pac. 876; Raymond v. State, 54 Miss. 562, 28 Am.
Rep. 382.) And they must be pleaded in some form, or there is
nothing on which to base a judgment. The rule as stated in
Blackstone above has been consistently followed by both English
and American courts ....
"The provision of section 9137, Revised Codes 1921, that, if
relied upon, the answer must contain 'a statement of any new
matter constituting a defense or counterclaim,' and the provisions
of section 9148 of the same Code that 'where the defendant deems
himself entitled to an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff,
by reason of a counterclaim interposed by him, he must demand
the judgment in his answer,' are but expressions of the common
law and were a part of our statutory law long prior to the com-
mencement of said cause ....
"Hungarian Hill Gravel Min, Co. v. Moses, 58 Cal. 168, was
a much stronger case, so far as the allegations of the answer are
concerned. The trial court in that case granted the defendant
affirmative relief, but the supreme court struck it from the decree,
for the reason that: 'The answer of the defendants contained none
of the elements of a cross-complaint, as distinguished from a de-
14
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It is submitted that the rule that the defendant is not pre-
cluded by the prayer of his counterclaim is sound, but the same
rule should be applicable whether the original suit is in equity
or at law, and regardless of whether the counterclaim is legal
or equitable in character. It is true that the code provides that
a defendant who deems himself entitled to an affirmative judg-
ment by reason of his counterclaim must demand the judgment
in his answer; also that a complaint must contain "a demand
of the relief which the plaintiff claims." Yet the supreme
court has held, without distinction between suits in equity and
actions at law, that the prayer is no part of the statement of a
cause of action in a complaint, and, if the complaint entitles the
plaintiff to any relief, a general demurrer will not lie, no mat-
ter what may be the form of the prayer, or, indeed, whether
there is any prayer at all.' The holding in Hageman v. Arnold,
that the amount of damages awarded a plaintiff cannot exceed
the amount asked,' apparently overlooked R. C. M. 1935, Sec-
tion 9316, which provides:
"The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no
answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded
in his complaint; but in any other case the court may
grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the
complaint and embraced within the issue."
fense to plaintiff's action, and contained no prayer for affirma-
tive relief. That part of the decree awarding affirmative relief
should be stricken out.'"
"R. C. M. 1935, §9129, sub. 3.
6Donovan v. McDevitt (1907) 36 Mont. 61, 92 P. 49 (complaint prayed
for Injunction; the court held it sufficient on demurrer, as it stated
facts entitling plaintiff to a money judgment). See also Merk v.
Bowery Mining Co. (1904) 31 Mont. 298, 78 P. 519; Rohr v. Stanton
(1927) 78 Mont. 494, 254 P. 869; Blackwelder v. Fergus Motor Co.
(1927) 80 Mont. 374, 260 P. 734; Murray v. Creese (1927) 80 Mont.
453, 260 P. 1051. And see First National Bank of Glendive v. Con-
ner (1929) 85 Mont. 229, 278 P. 143, in which case the court ap-
parently was of the opinion that the rule that a prayer Is no part
of the cause of action applies to cross-complaints.
"(1927) 79 Mont. 91, 95, 254 P. 1070. The court held an instruction
to be erroneous which did not limit the amount of damages, actual
and punitive, to that asked by plaintiff. There was no appearance
in behalf of respondent, and the court cited no authority for its posi-
tion.
"The wording of the code is unfortunate in applying the restriction to
the case where no answer has been filed. It seems that the codifiers
contemplated the case where the defendant did not appear and de-
fend, but the decisions have been conflicting. CT.ARK, CODE PLADING
(1928), pp. 181, 182.
The code adheres closely to the former rule in equity. In case of
default, relief is confined to relief demanded in the complaint, as was
the rule under prayer for special relief in equity, while in other cases
it is extended to granting relief similar to that granted under prayer
15
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The better view is that a plaintiff is entitled to any judgment
consistent with the facts alleged in his complaint and embraced
within the issues, regardless of whether it is a different type
of relief than has been prayed or more damages ;" and it is sub-
mitted that the same rule should apply to the relief to which a
defendant is entitled on his counterclaim.
The only substantial difference between an original cause
of action and a counterclaim, as we have seen, is that the first
is filed by the plaintiff and the second by the defendant. In
effect, a defendant who files a counterclaim becomes a plain-
tiff, and his counterclaim becomes a complaint; consequently,
the provisions of R. C. M. 1935, Section 9316, would seem ap-
plicable to counterclaims as well as to original complaints. If,
therefore, the plaintiff has replied, the demand in the counter-
claim should not limit the judgment. Under the code, the
proper question would seem to be simply whether the defend-
ant has stated facts constituting a cause of action; the prayer
is merely his legal conclusion as to the relief to which he is
entitled."
2. Necessary Parties to Counterclaim; Mutuality between Plain-
tiff's Cause of Action and Defendant's Counterclaim.
It has been stated as a general rule that the cause of action
constituting a counterclaim must be one in favor of a defendant
and against a plaintiff in the same capacity in which he sues."
No counterclaim against a co-defendant is contemplated by the
Montana statute,' although in 1919 the legislature adopted a
for general relief in courts of chancery. Johnson v. Polhemus (1893)
99 Calif. 240, 33 P. 908; Mock v. City of Santa Rosa (1899) 126 Calif.
330, 58 P. 826.
"CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), pp. 183, 184. And see FEDEnA RuLEs
OF CIvIL PRocEDuR, rule 54(c) : "A judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the
demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment
is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
7Of course, the counterclaim may be so indefinite that it does not
appear that the defendant is entitled to any judicial relief, in which
case it would be subject to demurrer, but It would seem that this
should be determined by the facts alleged and not the pleader's con-
clusion from those facts. Of. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 185,
with respect to the prayer in a complaint.
7POMROY, ConE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §630. In an action against
an agent for rents collected on a married woman's separate estate, a
claim against her as administratrix of her husband for a debt due
from him cannot be set up. Rutherford v. Talent (1886) 6 Mont. 132,
9 P. 821.
"'Alywin v. Morley (1910) 41 Mont. 191, 206, 108 P. 778. See also
Meredith v. Roman, supra, note 49: R. C. M. 1035, §9177, which pro-
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statute providing for similar relief by cross-complaint against a
co-defendant and also new parties." It has even been held in
vides, "Where the judgment may determine the ultimate rights of
two or more defendants, as between themselves, a defendant who re-
quires such a determination must demand it in his answer. The con-
troversy between the defendants must not delay a judgment, to which
plaintiff is entitled, unless the court otherwise directs," does not per-
mit the adjustment of the rights of defendants inter sese in a case
where they are wholly independent of and not in any way connected
with the rights of the plaintiff.
7Ch. 177, §1, LAWS OF MONTANA 1919; R. C. M. 1935, §9151.
".. A cross-complaint should be as distinct and separate from
an answer as any other independent pleading; It must state facts
sufficient to entitle cross-complainant to affirmative relief, and also
all facts sufficient to show that the demand is a proper subject of
cross-complaint." Callender v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate, supra, note
59, 84 Mont. at p. 274.
It does not have to state a cause of action against all parties to
the action; "any defendant who desires relief against any party If he
has a cause of action which is properly the subject of cross-complaint
may prosecute his cause of action by cross-complaint and obtain relief
against any party." State ex rel Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. District
Court (1936) 102 Mont. 371, 377, 58 P. (2d) 491.
If the defendant puts in issue the amount due to plaintiff, he may
by cross-complaint make others who are adverse claimants parties to
the action. "The relief permitted differs from that obtainable under
interpleader, in that it permits defendant to contest with plaintiff the
extent of his liability, and when that liability is determined it author-
izes the court to decide to which of the adverse claimants the liability
extends or to apportion the amount found to be due to the several
claimants according to their respective rights." Security State Bank
of Roy v. Melchert (1923) 67 Mont. 535, 543, 216 P. 340. However, in
State ex rel Bedord v. District Court (1941) - Mont. - , 114 P.
(2d) 265, the court held that a cross-complaint cannot be used for
the sole purpose of bringing into the case additional parties, or secur-
ing a substitution of parties, but "the basis of a cross-complaint must
be a demand which may be carried forward as a cause of action and
which might have been the subject of an independent action, and
upon which there may be a recovery." The court discountenanced
Zunchich v. Security Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1929) 85 Mont 341, 278
P. 1011, where defendant who was denied relief by way of inter-
pleader under R. C. M. 1935, §9087, was permitted to substitute a new
party as a party defendant by means of a cross-complaint, although
the court stated that the Zunchich case was correct on the record.
Angstman, J. dissenting: "He should have the right to have the
plaintiff and the defendants in the cross-complaint litigate their re-
spective rights so that he would not be subject to two actions for the
same money. This he may do without depositing the money [a re-
quirement under the interpleader statute, R. C. M. 1935, §9087] where,
as here, he remained in the case and subjected himself to whatever
judgment the court saw fit to pronounce in the light of the facts."
There are three classes of cases: (1) where the relief sought re-
lates to or is dependent upon the contract, transaction or subject mat-
ter upon which the action is brought; (2) where the relief sought
affects the property to which the action relates; (3) where the judg-
ment in the action may determine the ultimate rights of the defend-
ants to an action between themselves. In the first two classes, the
relief sought by the cross-complaint must to some extent affect the
plaintiff's action or interfere with the relief sought by him, but this
17
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some jurisdictions that, in the absence of special statutory pro-
vision, where the plaintiff is an assignee, no demand accruing to
the defendant against the assignor can be enforced as a counter-
claim, although it may under certain circumstances be a good
defense in bar of recovery." However, in Montana the statute
expressly permits the defendant to plead a claim against the
plaintiff's assignor as a counterclaim under the contract clause
of the counterclaim statute, for the purpose of diminishing the
recovery by the assignee."
is not necessary in the third class. State ex rel Union Central Life
Ins. Co. v. District Court, supra, limiting Callendar v. Crossfield Oil
Syndicate, supra, and holding that in an action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage, in which the plaintiff claimed to be entitled to a
crop of wheat, a cross-complaint against an intervenor was proper to
obtain a determination of title to the purchase price and wheat as
between the defendant and the Intervener.
It is not necessary that the cause of action stated in the cross-
complaint be in existence at the commencement of the action, even
though the cause of action be on: based on contract, R. C. M. 1935,
§9151, unlike the counterclaim statute, containing no such limitation.
Callender v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate, supra; State e. rel Union Cen-
tral Life Ins. Co. v. District Court, 8upra.
The defendant has his election to plead a cross-complaint or re-
serve it for a future independent action, an election which he does
not have as to counterclaims within the first subdivision of R. C. M.
1935, §9138. Stockgrowers' Finance Corp. v. Nett (1931) 91 Mont.
334, 7 P. (2d) 540.
"See PomEmoY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §628; CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928), p. 475.
-R. C. M. 1935, §9139:
"Counterlaim-rules thereof. But the counterclaim, specified
In subdivision 2 of the last section, is subject to the following rules:
1. If the action is founded upon a contract, which has been
assigned by the party thereto, other than a negotiable promissory
note or bill of exchange, a demand existing against the party
thereto, or an assignee of the contract, at the time of the assign-
ment thereof, and belonging to the defendant, In good faith, before
notice of the assignment, must be allowed as a counterclaim, to the
amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it might have been so allowed
against the party, or the assignee, while the contract belonged to
him.
2. If the action is upon a negotiable promissory note or bill
of exchange, which has been assigned to the plaintiff after it be-
came due, a demand, existing against a person who assigned or
transferred it, after It became due, must be allowed as a counter-
claim, to the amount of the plaintiff's demand, if it might have been
so allowed against the assignor, while the note or bill belonged to
him.
3. If the plaintiff is a trustee for another, or if the action
is in the name of the plaintiff, who has no actual interest in the
contract upon which it is founded, a demand against the plaintiff
shall not be allowed as a counterclaim; but so much of a demand
existing against the person whom he represents, or for whose bene-
fit the action is brought, as will satisfy the plaintiff's demand, must
be allowed as a counterclaim, if it might have been so allowed in
an action brought by the person beneficially interested."
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Not only must the counterclaim be in favor of a defendant
and against a plaintiff, but it must be in favor of all the de-
fendants and against all the plaintiffs, except where a separate
judgment can be had. Thus, in the early case of Kemp v. Mc-
Cormick, plaintiff brought an action on a promissory note
against two joint makers. One of the defendants attempted to
set up as a counterclaim a claim due him individually from the
plaintiff. The court held that such a counterclaim was not per-
missible under the provision of the statute that the claim "shall
be one existing in favor of the defendant . . . , and against a
plaintiff . . . , between whom a several judgment might be had
in the action."' ' The court said:
"This is the same as the California statute on the sub-
ject of set-off, and in a judicial construction of the same (20
Cal. 281), the converse of the proposition here was there
held, where a joint debt was sought to be set off against an
individual debt.
"And upon the same principle an individual debt can-
not be set off against a joint debt or liability.'"
Again, in Collier v. Ervin, decided in 1878, the court took
the position that, "An individual claim cannot be set up as a
counter-claim to a joint indebtedness without alleging that the
plaintiff is insolvent.'
However, in an action on a joint obligation of partners, one
partner may avail himself of a counterclaim in favor of the part-
nership, even though such partner is separately sued or answers
separately, "the fundamental principle being that, if the de-
mands are mutual, one may be counterclaimed as against an
action upon the other." '
And, if a plaintiff sues two or more defendants on a joint
and several obligation, severance in judgment may be had and
a counterclaim by one of the defendants for an obligation to him
individually is proper.' In general, severance in recovery is
possible whenever the right sought to be maintained on the one
"Since 1895 the statute has required the counterclaim to be a cause
of action "against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the per-
son he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or of one or more
defendants, between whom and the plaintiff a separate judgment may
be had in the action." This change in terminology would not seem
to change the sense of the statute. It may be observed that the stat-
ute uses the singular number, "the plaintiff"; but R. C. M. 1935, §16,
expressly provides that the singular includes the plural.
"(1872) 1 Mont. 420, 423.
3 Mont. 142, 146.
"First National Bank of Butte v. Silver (1912) 45 Mont. 231, 236, 122
P. 584.
=See Scott v. Waggoner, supra, note 34, 48 Mont. at p. 548.
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side, and the liability to be enforced on the other, are not orig-
inally joint.'
Of course, the common law doctrine of joint rights and lia-
bilities, which was the basis of the decisions in Kemp v. McCor-
mick and Collier v. Ervin, has under-gone considerable change
as a result of the enactment in 1895 of the provision of what is
now R. C. M. 1935, Section 7398, that "All joint obligations and
covenants shall hereafter be taken to be joint and several obliga-
tions and covenants." Apparently the only case in Montana
holding a counterclaim improper on the ground of lack of sev-
erability of judgment, since the enactment of this statute, is
Heinrich v. Kirby. In that case, plaintiff brought an action
against an individual defendant to recover the price of livestock
sold to him. Defendant set up as a counterclaim claims for
services rendered to plaintiff by a partnership consisting of de-
fendant and another, and proof of the consent of the latter to
the counterclaim was offered at the trial. The court held that
the defendant could not maintain the counterclaim, saying:
" ...A separate judgment could not be had between
plaintiff and defendant upon the defendant's counterclaim
in this case, because the counterclaim is in favor of the part-
nership and the partnership is not a defendant in the case;
and for the further reason that the partnership is not in-
debted to the plaintiff, so the plaintiff could not have in this
case a judgment against the co-partnership. There is no
mutuality between the cause of action pleaded by the plain-
tiff and the counterclaims set up by the defendant.
The consent . .. does not bring it within the
definition of a counterclaim.""
If partnership rights remain joint, the result reached by the
court would follow, for no person other than a defendant can
join with a defendant in filing a counterclaim, and if a claim is
owned jointly by a defendant and another the common law doc-
trine of joint rights would prevent the defendant from asserting
it as a counterclaim.' However, if the claim is in reality joint
and several, so that the plaintiff is liable to the defendant indi-
vidually, then the counterclaim would seem to be proper regard-
less of whether the other obligee is a party to the suit or not.
Nevertheless, the court in Heinrich v. Kirby made no reference
whatever to R. C. M. 1935, Section 7398, and did not discuss the
'POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §631.
8"(1922) 64 Mont. 1, 5, 6, 208 P. 897.
"PoMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §627.
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extent to which the common law doctrines of joint rights and
liabilities have been changed.
In such a discussion, it would seem that two questions would
arise: first, whether the statute making joint obligations joint
and several applies to partnership obligations, a question which
is not free from doubt in Montana ;" second, whether the statute
makes joint rights, as well as joint obligations, joint and several,
a question which has yet to receive adequate consideration."
However, regardless of the applicability of R. C. M. 1935, Sec-
tion 7398, to a situation such as that presented in the Heinrich
case, it is not apparent how its applicability could be avoided in
situations such as those presented in the Kemp and Collier cases.
It is submitted that the Kemp and Collier cases are no longer
controlling authorities on the matter here under discussion, and
that in an action by a single plaintiff against several defendants
on their joint obligation, at least if it is not a partnership obli-
gation, there should be no objection to a counterclaim by one of
the defendants on an individual claim of his against the plain-
tiff.
'*Toelle, Joint and Several Liability of Partie8 in Montana, 1 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 142 (1928-29).
'R. C. M. 1935, §9083, reqiring the joinder as plaintiffs or defendants
of all parties united in interest, may indicate joint rights are to be
considered differently than joint obligations. However, there seems
little reason for making the severability of judgment depend upon
which of the parties are plaintiffs and which are defendants.
oThe question of how far the common law doctrine of joint rights and
joint obligations has been changed by provisions of the codes of civil
procedure, such as R. C. M. 1935, §9314, providing: "Judgment may be
given for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, and for or
against one or more of several defendants; and it may, when the
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the
parties on each side, as between themselves," has been a matter upon
which the courts have not been in agreement. POMEROY, CODE REME-
DIES (5th ed. 1929), §633 states:
".... The judges of one school have denied any modification in
these legal notions, and have restricted the language of the statute
to equitable proceedings. Another school have gone to the opposite
extreme, and have declared the ancient rules as to joint right and
liability to be utterly abolished, so that a severance among the
plaintiffs or defendants in the recovery may be had in all cases.
This loose or liberal interpretation has, however, been utterly re-
pudiated by other cases, which, as it seems to me, establish, by a
very decided preponderance of judicial authority, the doctrine as
now generally accepted in those States whose codes compose the
two groups mentioned at the commencement of the section. The
doctrine established by these decisions is, that if the demand in
suit was originally joint and several, although the action upon it is
joint, and a fortiori if it was several, a several judgment might
have been recovered, and the counter-claim against part of the
plaintiffs, or in favor of a part of the defendants, is possible: when
the demand in suit is originally joint, a severance is impossible."
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3. Limitation That the Counterclaim Diminish or Defeat Plain-
tiff's Recovery.
The reason for the limitation in the statute, that a counter-
claim "must tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat the plain-
tiff's recovery," has been stated by the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana to be that the law contemplates but one judgment dispos-
ing of the issues in a case, and does not contemplate that there
be two separate judgments, neither of which interferes with
the execution of the other." Construing the limitation in the
light of this purpose, the court has treated it as applicable to
counterclaims under the transaction clause of the first subdi-
vision, as well as to those under the contract clause of the sec-
ond subdivision, of R. C. M. 1935, Section 9138.'
Applying the limitation, it has been held that a defendant
in a condemnation proceeding cannot set up his claim for dam-
ages, either special or general, in a counterclaim ;' that a count-
erclaim for a money judgment is not available in an action for
forcible entry," in a claim and delivery action," in a proceeding
to enjoin interfering with harvesting operations," or in a suit
to set aside a transfer of property;" and that a counterclaim to
foreclose a chattel mortgage and recover attorney fees and ex-
penses is not available in a suit to enjoin the sale of the prop-
erty under the mortgage pursuant to a power of sale contained
in it." In such cases, the position is taken that, as the plaintiff
merely seeks possession of property, a judgment for defendant
for money would not interfere with the execution of a judg-
ment for the plaintiff, and therefore defendant's claim does
not tend to defeat or diminish plaintiff's recovery."
"Osmers v. Furey (1905) 32 Mont. 581, 81 P. 345; Spellman v. Rhode
(1905) 33 Mont. 21, 81 P. 395; Friedrichsen v. Cobb, 8upra, note 38.
'Osmers v. Furey, supra, note 89, and see cases, infra, notes 91 to 96,
inclusive.
"Yellowstone Park Railroad Co. v. Bridger Coal Co. (1906) 34 Mont.
545, 87 P. 963.
'Spellman v. Rhode, supra, note 89.
"Osmer v. Furey, 8upra, note 89.
"Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Wilson (1923) 67 Mont. 147, 214 P. 1104.
"Hanrahan v. Anderson (1939) 108 Mont. 218, 90 P. (2d) 494.
"Stockgrowers' Finance Corp. v. Nett, 8upra, note 75. The court did
not specifically state that the objection to the counterclaim was that
it did not tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery, but did
say: "The case of Friedrichsen v. Cobb, 84 Mont. 283, 275 Pac. 267,
clearly lays down the rule that such a cause of action as is set out in
plaintiff's complaint herein would not have been available as a coun-
terclaim in the former action for injunction."
'In Hillman v. Luzon Cafe Co., supra, note 49, in a suit to recover the
balance of the purchase price of a machine, the court said that the
allegation in an answer if regarded as a counterclaim for return of
the purchase price paid, was obnoxious to the elementary rule that the
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However, it seems that in an action to foreclose a real es-
tate mortgage, a counterclaim for real estate commissions due
from the plaintiff is available." If the suit were merely to ob-
tain possession of the property and no money judgment were
sought, apparently a counterclaim for a money judgment
would not be proper ;' although in Friedrichsen v. Cobb,' the
court took the position that a counterclaim for breach of the
contract sought to be foreclosed is proper, if the establishment
of the counterclaim is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's right
to recover possession.'
matter alleged must tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery,
and must constitute a cause of action complete within itself. Of course,
it is self evident that if a counterclaim does not state a cause of ac-
tion complete within itself, it cannot defeat or diminish plaintiff's re-
covery. If the court meant that such a counterclaim although stating
a cause of action complete within itself would not be available, be-
cause it does not tend to diminish or defeat plaintiffs recovery, it is
submitted that such a holding is unsound. If there Is any situation
where a counterclaim tends to diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery,
it is where both parties are seeking money Judgments.
"See Flatt v. Norman, supra, note 61, holding that the answer was not
subject to a motion to strike. See also Griffiths v. Thrasher (1933)
95 Mont. 210, 26 P. (2d) 995, holding, in an action to foreclose a chat-
tel mortgage, that a "cross-complaint" for damages for fradulent mis-
representation in the sale leading to the execution of the mortgage
was not subject to demurrer on the ground that the claim did not come
within the transaction set forth in plaintiff's complaint. Of course,
in the usual action to foreclose a mortgage the plaintiff obtains a
money judgment and a decree that the property be sold to satisfy the
same, subject to redemption by the mortgagor; and the action is not
an action to obtain possession of the property.
'See cases supra, notes 91 to 96, inclusive; CLARK, CODn PL.ADING
(1928), p. 448.
"Supra, note 38. The court took the position, in a suit to foreclose a
contract for the sale of land, that a cause of action which would not
have been sufficient to entitle plaintiff to rescission or equitable relief
from foreclosure would nevertheless have been sufficient to state a
cause of action for damages for breach of the contract and to bar re-
covery by plaintiff. Angstman, J., dissenting: The cause of action
of the defendant in the foreclosure action was for damages based on
alleged fraud of plaintiff with respect to his ownership of certificates
of purchase. Defendant "could not have retained possession of the
land and asserted as a defense that the title was defective, and neither
could he, while retaining possession, have filed a cross-complaint for
money paid under the contract."
1See also Apple v. Edwards (1932) 92 Mont. 524, 16 P. (2d) 700, hold-
ing that, in a suit by an assignee of a conditional sales vendor in
claim and delivery to recover animals from a conditional sales vendee,
it was error to strike a defense, designated an "affirmative defense in
the nature of a cross-complaint and counterclaim," which alleged
fraud in the Inception of the contract by the seller and prayed that
defendant be adjudged to have a lien upon the animals for what they
had paid and for expense in caring for them, the defendant having a
right to rescind the contract for fraud and having an equitable lien
on the animals which he could enforce by "recoupment." The court said
at p. 537 of 92 Mont.: "The defense thus asserted challenges plaintiff's
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Thus the court has construed the limitation that the coun-
terclaim tend to diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery as a re-
quirement that it be of such a character as that the judgment
upon it will interfere with the execution of the judgment
sought by the plaintiff. Except for the qualification of Fried-
richsen v. Cobb, such a requirement prevents any cross-demand
for an affirmative judgment, as distinct from a defense, in any
suit to recover or enforce a right to possession of specific prop-
erty, a result which seems foreign to the purpose of the coun-
terclaim statute to enable and require the parties to adjust in
one action their differences growing out of any given trans-
action and to prevent the multiplicity of suits. Furthermore,
such a requirement seems inconsistent with the provisions of
the code with respect to the relief to which a defendant is en-
titled on a counterclaim. The code not only provides that,
where a counterclaim is established which exceeds the plain-
tiff's demand, the defendant must have judgment for the ex-
cess,' but it also provides that "where a counterclaim is es-
tablished, which entitled the defendant to an affirmative judg-
ment, demanded in the answer, judgment must be rendered for
the defendant accordingly."' It would seem to be much more
in accord with the purpose and scope of the code provisions if
the limitation were construed as requiring merely that the
counterclaim be of such a character as that either the judg-
ment upon it and the judgment sought by the plaintiff relate
to the same subject matter, or that the judgment upon it inter-
fere with the execution of the judgment sought by the plain-
tiff. So construed, the limitation has no practical application
except to counterclaims under the second subdivision of the
statute; and it is true that the position of the limitation in Sec-
tion 9138 seems to make it applicable to both subdivisions, as a
limitation not to be found in either subdivision itself. How-
ever, a construction which results in a conclusion that there is
a certain amount of duplication in a section of the code is to be
preferred to one which is out of harmony with its purpose and
right of possession, and will not necessitate the entry of two judg-
ments.... The equitable lien, if established, would entitle defendants
to retain possession of the pigs until the lien was discharged ......
And cf. Fleming v. Consolidated Motor Sales Co. (1925) 74 Mont.
245, 240 P. 376, holding that, in an action to cancel incompetent's con-
tract for purchase of automobile and purchase money notes, defendant
is entitled to recover, by way of "cross-complaint or counterclaim,"
principal and interest on purchase money notes due and payable and
reasonable attorney's fees as provided in said notes.
"2R. C. M. 1935, §9140.
"'R. C. M. 1935, §9141.
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inconsistent with the scope of other sections relating to the
same subject.'
4. Limitation That the Counterclaim Exist at the Commence-
ment of the Action.
In McGuire v. Edsall,"' decided in 1894, the Supreme Court
of Montana, without indicating the character of the counter-
claim involved, laid down the broad rule that a counterclaim
to be available must be one existing and matured for action in
favor of the party asserting the same at the time the action was
commenced wherein such counterclaim is sought to be pleaded.
Strangely enough the court made no reference to the explicit
provision of the second subdivision of the statute, dealing with
contract counterclaims and providing that the counterclaim be
a cause of action "existing at the commencement of the suit";
but relied upon the general language preceding the subdivi-
sions, that the counterclaim "shall be one existing in favor of
defendant ... and against a plaintiff,... between whom a sev-
eral judgment may be had in the action . . . . " It may be in-
ferred, therefore, that the rule thus stated was intended to be
applicable alike to counterclaims under the first subdivision
and those under the second subdivision of the statute.
In support of the rule thus stated, the court cited thirteen
cases. Two of these cases did not deal with the specific ques-
tion ;1' and the others, except one,' were cases involving either
contract counterclaims or set-offs. As to the one exception, the
only indication of the character of the counterclaim involved
is in the syllabus of the case, from which it appears that it was
'Clauses of a statute should be interpreted with reference to the con-
text; one section of a statute may stand as context to another, pro-
vided it bears upon the general subject matter; and courts will trans-
pose clauses or even sentences so as to place them in their just con-
nection with the context to which they relate. BLACK, INTERPRErA-
TION OF LAWS (1911), pp. 242-244. Further, that construction of a
statute should be adopted which promotes and carries out to the full-
est extent the legislative purpose, and if that purpose is only to ef-
fect a particular class of persons, the generality of language will not
have the effect of including one not belonging to this class. BLACK,
op. Cit., pp. 76-80. The same rule would seem applicable when dealing
with a class of cases as when dealing with a class of persons.
The limitation that a counterclaim tend to diminish or defeat
the plaintiff's recovery has been imposed by many courts in the ab-
sence of express statutory provision. For a criticism of the limita-
tion as applied to other than counterclaims under the second sub-
division of the statute, see POMERoy, CoDE REMEDIfES (5th ed. .1929),
§621. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 449.
0514 Mont. 359, 36 P. 453.
"'Smith v. Washington Gaslight Co., 31 Md. 12, 100 Am. Dec. 49; Gregg
v. James, Breese, 143, 12 Am. Dec. 152.
"7Jeffreys v. Hancock, 57 Cal. 646.
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a transaction counterclaim; but, in holding that the counter-
claim was not available, the court gave no reason, and the argu-
ment of counsel preceding the opinion was not only that the
claim did not exist at the commencement of the action but also
that the facts alleged did not arise out of the transaction set
forth in the complaint and were not connected with the subject
of the action and did not arise on contract. Therefore, it seems
that that case was hardly authority for a position that a trans-
action counterclaim is not available unless it is in existence
at the time the plaintiff commences his action.
When one looks to the purpose sought to be accomplished
by the limitation, it is evident that there was no good reason
for the interpolation of the words "at the commencement of
the suit" after the word "existing." As was said by the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina, when dealing with a statute
similar to that relied upon in McGuire v. Edsall:
"... It will be noted that the requirement restricting
a counterclaim to one that exists at the time the action
was commenced is only stated in reference to the second
class of counterclaims described in the statute-those
wherein an action on a contract, the breach of an entirely
different and distinct contract, is set up by defendant.
This, for the very just and obvious reason that when a
plaintiff rightfully sues a defendant who owes him at the
time the action is commenced, he shall not be put in the
wrong and subjected to cost by allowing defendant to buy
up claims sufficient or more than sufficient to offset his
debt. But this limitation is not expressed with reference
to counterclaims in the first subdivision of the statute.
These must be existent and continue to exist between the
same parties in the same right at the time they are offered,
and they must be then due-that is, not demands to be-
come due in the future . . . "
Nevertheless, apparently stemming from McGuire v. Ed-
sall, and without any real examination of the question, subse-
quent Montana cases have applied the limitation stated in that
case to all counterclaims, without distinction as to their char-
acter as transaction or contract counterclaims.' And this has
"'Smith v. French (1906) 141 N. C. 1, 53 S. E. 435, 437, 438, SUNDEP-
LAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, p. 1224.
'For the application of the rule to contract counterclaims: Heinrich
v. Kirby, supras p. 52 (Held counterclaim not available, because,
for one reason, the consent of the other partner could not be retro-
active and vest title in defendant at the time the suit was com-
menced.) ; Dreidlein v. Manger (1923) 69 Mont. 155, 220 P. 1107
(Action to recover damages for breach of contract; counterclaim
on judgment obtained in another suit after commencement of the ac-
tion. Held, counterclaim not available, the court relying upon the
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been done without regard to the fact that since 1895 the clause
language of the second subdivision of the statute) ; Lappin v. Martin,
supra, note 49. (Action to recover for work and labor performed for
defendant; counterclaim for pasturages and other items furnished to
plaintiff. Held, proof that the defendants had furnished the pastur-
age to plaintiff was properly excluded after statement of counsel for
defendant indicating "that defendant's motion of charging plaintiff"
did not arise until after the commencement of the action. Query:
Was not the real question one of whether there was any obligation on
the plaintiff to pay at any time, or whether the items were gratui-
ties?) ; Dick v. King, supra, note 51 (Action to recover on promissory
notes; counterclaim for work and labor done and materials furnished
under a contract. Held, no error was committed in excluding evidence
offered in support of the counterclaim, the contract upon which it
was predicated having been superseded and terminated prior to the
commencement of the action. Query: Would not the rule that the
counterclaim must be a cause of action have been more to the point?)
For the application of the rule to transaction counterclaims: Cook
& Woldson v. Gallatin Rd. Co. (1903) 28 Mont. 509, 73 P. 131 (Action
on quantum meruit for services rendered in delivering certain ties;
counterclaim for damages from delay resultant from failure of plain-
tiff to deliver ties as required by the contract. Held, counterclaim not
available, because damages did not occur until after suit commenced.) ;
Boucher v. Powers (1904) 29 Mont. 342, 74 P. 942 (Suit by assignee of
contractor to foreclose lien for contract price of removal of building;
counterclaim on judgment for assignee of workmen to whom the con-
tractor, before the action was commenced, gave orders on defendant
for work done in removal of the building, which judgment was ob-
tained and paid after action was commenced. Held, if regarded mere-
ly as "money paid, laid out and expended," not available as a counter-
claim; but, as the claims for labor done were liens against the prop-
erty of plaintiff, whether paid or not, they were proper to be pleaded
as equitable defense.) ; Yellowstone Park Rd. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co.,
supra, note 91 (Condemnation proceedings; held, plaintiff cannot be
heard to complain of defendant's failure to plead his damages, counter-
claim for damages not being available, because, for one reason, defend-
ant had no cause of action when proceedings commenced) ; Scott v.
Waggoner, supra, note 34 (Action by landlord against lessee and sure-
ties on lessee's bond for rent on lease of hotel and damages for waste
committed on the premises; counterclaim for conversion of personal
property placed on the premises by defendant and alleged to have been
taken upon wrongful reentry on the premises by plaintiff. Held,
counterclaim available only if reentry was wrongful so that no demand
was necessary, or if demand had been made when action begun);
Hammond v. Thompson (1918) 54 Mont. 609, 173 P. 229 (Claim and
delivery action; held, claim for damages for wrongful detention of
property seized not a counterclaim, since it arises after commencement
of action, but such damages are incident to right of successful de-
fendant to a return of the property and must be pleaded.); Cook-
Reynolds Co. v. Wilson, supra, note 94 (Suit by lessor to enjoin de-
fendant from interfering with operations to harvest volunteer crop,
and injunction issued and plaintiff harvested and marketed crop while
same effective; subsequent counterclaim by defendant for value of his
share. Held, counterclaim not available, because, for one reason, cause
of action not in existeiLce when suit commenced.) ; Griffiths v. Thrash-
er, supra, note 98 (Action to foreclose chattel mortgage; counterclaim
for damages by reason of the commencement of the action by taking
over the property in the course of the suit. Held, counterclaim not
available, because the basis therefor did not exist at the time of the
commencement of the suit.)
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of the statute which precedes the subdivisions does not even
require that the counterclaim must be one "existing in favor of
defendant," but rather provides that the cause of action must
"tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recov-
ery, and must be one of the following causes of action against
the plaintiff." And it has also been done without regard to
the fact that since 1919 the code makes provision for cross-
complaints, as to which no such limitation exists..' The cross-
complaint statute provides that a defendant may file a cross-
complaint when he "desires any relief against any party re-
lating to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, or sub-
ject matter upon which the action is brought, or affecting the
property to which it relates;" and the Supreme Court has stat-
ed that its purpose is "to broaden the rule which obtained un-
der the ancient chancery practice by permitting the determina-
tion in the one action of the ultimate rights of the parties af-
fecting the subject matter involved in the litigation."" It
would seem, therefore, that a cause of action which is a trans-
action counterclaim may also be considered as a cross-com-
plaint and the limitation thus avoided.
Therefore, both as a matter of grammatical construction of
the counterclaim statute itself and from the standpoint of its
purpose, to prevent the defendant, upon notice of suit, from
buying up contract claims against the plaintiff and thus put-
ting him in the wrong and making him bear the costs of the
suit, application of the limitation to counterclaims within the
first subdivision is unsound; and, since the adoption of the
cross-complaint statute, there seems to be no purpose which can
be accomplished by such an application of the limitation.
Assuming that the counterclaim is one to which the limi-
tation is applicable, questions arise as to the meaning of the
language "existing at the commencement of the action." The
action is "commenced" at the time of the filing of the original
complaint, and not at the time of the filing of an amendment,
unless the amendment states a new cause of action."' Also, as
has been pointed out, the Supreme Court of Montana has said
that the requirement is that the counterclaim be "matured for
action" at the time of the commencement of the suit. As has
been stated by Professor Charles E. Clark, now judge of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the second circuit,
such a limitation tends to defeat the ultimate purpose of the
uoSee supra, note 75.
"'Callender v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate, supra, note 59, 84 Mont. at p. 273.
n2Boucher v. Powers, supra, note 109: Dreidlein v. Manger, supra, note
109.
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counterclaim; and he suggests that, if the cause of action be
viewed as the operative facts giving ground for judicial relief,
the existence of most of such facts in favor of defendant at the
time the suit is commenced could plausibly be held to satisfy
this limitation." Under such an approach the limitation would
be satisfied if the defendant owned the claim when the suit was
commenced although it did not mature until after commence-
ment of suit. Fleming v. Consolidated Motor Sales Co."' seems
to have used such an approach, but it does not appear from the
case that the question was raised or that it was material to the
result; and, in view of other holdings,' 5 the limitation in Mon-
tana must, it seems, be regarded as requiring that defendant's
cause of action be matured at the commencement of the suit.
5. What Constitutes a Transaction Counterclaim.
The first subdivision of the counterclaim statute, as we
have seen," specifies three different and distinct causes of ac-
tion which not only may be availed of as counterclaims but of
which a defendant is obliged to so avail himself or be barred
from another suit thereon,"' namely: 1. those which arise out
of the contract sued upon; 2. those which arise out of the
transaction sued upon; 3. those which are connected with the
subject matter of the action. The cases in the several states
applying similar provisions have been numerous and conflict-
ing, and various theories and schools of interpretation are to
be found. Little attempt has been made in the cases to sepa-
rately define each phrase of the statute, but the courts have
confined themselves to a determination of whether the counter-
claim is one of the three types, frequently without distinguish-
ing between them.
'CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), pp. 461, 462.
'Supra, note 101. Defendant, by what the court called a "cross-com-
plaint or counterclaim," sought judgment on promissory notes. The
court held that defendant was not entitled to judgment on one of the
notes, because it was not due at the time of the filing of the "cross-
complaint or counterclaim," but was entitled to judgment on the oth-
ers. The case contains no reference to the time when the action was
commenced and no suggestion as to whether any of the notes upon
which recovery was allowed was then due.
u5Dreidlein v. Manger, supra, note 109; Scott v. Waggoner, supra, note
34.
"Supra, p. 38.
u'It must affirmatively appear from the pleadings that the counterclaim
is within subdivision 1, if a party is to be held to be barred from
maintaining an action therefor because of failure to assert the claim
in prior suit. Kaufman v. Cooper (1909) 39 Mont. 146, 101 P. 969.
"'POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §644.
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Probably the greatest confusion has resulted from the
terms "transaction" and "subject of the action." Two funda-
mentally different views of the term "transaction" are to be
found in the cases.' According to one view, a "transaction"
is a series of acts constituting a single event, looking at an
event through the lawyer's eyes. So viewed a transaction is
limited to a group of acts which have but one set of applicable
legal principles. According to the other view, it is a series of
acts constituting a single event as the layman looks at it. So
viewed it is not important that the plaintiff's cause of action
and the defendant's cause of action are governed by different
legal principles, or are proved by different evidence, or met by
different defenses; but rather a transaction encompasses any
group of circumstances which have a bearing one upon the oth-
er and covers acts which occurred because something else oc-
curred.'
Some of the early Montana cases reflect the first of these
views, the court stating that a counterclaim based upon tort
cannot be availed of in an action based upon contract, and,
conversely, that a counterclaim based upon contract cannot be
availed of in an action based upon tort.' However, these cases
are no longer controlling, and it seems that the Montana court
has definitely committed itself to the layman's view of what is
a "transaction." In Scott v. Waggoner,' the court, starting
with the proposition that the statutory provisions were de-
signed to enable parties litigant to adjust their difficulties in
one action, so far as that can logically be done, and thereby
prevent multiplicity of suits, and that statutes so highly rem-
edial should be given a broad and liberal construction, said:
". .. The reason assigned for the doctrine that a
counterclaim sounding in tort cannot be pleaded as against
a demand upon contract is the supposed impossibility of
legal connection between the two events; but every money
demand is either upon contract or upon tort, and the same
'McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L. J. 614, 643-647
(1925).
'"Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes Which Contain the Term "Subject
of the Action" and Which Relate to Joinder of Actions and Plaintiffs
and to Counterclaims, 18 COaNELL L. Q. 232 (1933).
'DWells v. Clarkson, supra, note 8; Collier v. Ervin, supra, note 80;
Potter v. Lohse (1904) 31 Mont. 91, 77 P. 419; Osmers v. Furey, 8upra,
note 89; Davis v. Frederick (1887) 6 Mont. 300, 12 P. 664. Scott v.
Waggoner expressly denied the authority of Wells v. Clarkson, Collier
v. Ervin, and Potter v. Lohse for the proposition that in no instance
can a counterclaim technically in tort arise out of the same transaction
as plaintiff's demand, when the latter is ex contractu in form, and
disapproved the proposition itself.'Supra, note 109.
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reason may be and is assigned with stronger emphasis for
denying the right to plead a counterclaim in tort as
against a demand in tort. If a counterclaim in tort cannot
be pleaded as against a demand either upon tort or in con-
tract, then, in the case of money demands we have a coun-
terclaim which is not a counterclaim-a conclusion which
cannot be accepted. As pointed out by Mr. Pomeroy (Code
Remedies, Div. 6, subd. 1), the solvent of the difficulty lies
in the breadth and scope of the terms 'transaction' and 'sub-
ject of the action.' The term 'transaction' is not legal and
technical-it is common and colloquial; it is therefore to be
construed according to the context and to approved usage
(Rev. Codes, see. 8070)."' As so construed it is broader than
'contract' and broader than 'tort,' although it may include
either or both; it is 'that combination of acts and events, cir-
cumstances and defaults, which viewed in one aspect, results
in the plaintiff's right of action, and viewed in another as-
pect, results in defendant's right of action (Pomeroy's
Code Remedies, sec. 774), and it applies to any dealings of
the parties resulting in wrong, without regard to whether
the wrong be done by violence, neglect, or breach of con-
tract.'... When in this sense of the word a cause of action
in favor of the defendant arises from the 'transaction' set
forth in the foundation of plaintiff's claim, it is pleadable
as a counterclaim, no matter what its technical soundings
or those of plaintiff's demand may be . .. "'
Again, in Mulcahy v. Duggan, in an action for damages
for an assault and battery by defendant on May 17, a counter-
claim for libel published by plaintiff of and concerning the
defendant on May 8 was held to be proper. The court quoted
Scott v. Waggoner with approval and said:
"In order to determine whether a counterclaim arises
out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the
foundation of plaintiff's claim, we are not limited to the
facts alleged in the complaint. We look to 'all the facts
and circumstances out of which arose the injury com-
plained of by him alone.' . . . We approve the language
used by the author in 34 Cyc. 687 note 63, where, in stat-
ing the holding of Story, etc., Commercial Co. v. Story, 100
Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671, he says: 'The transaction is not lim-
ited to the facts set forth in the complaint, but includes the
entire series of acts and mutual conduct of the parties in the
business or proceeding between them which formed the basis
of the agreement, and, if plaintiff omits or fails to set forth
in his complaint the entire transaction out of which his
claim arose, the defendant may supplement this omission by
"Provision now contained in R. C. M. 1935, §15.
'48 Mont. 536, 544, 545.
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setting forth in his answer the omitted facts, so that the
entire transaction may be before the court, for plaintiff is
not at liberty to select an isolated act or fact which is only
one of a series of acts or steps in the entire transaction, and
insist upon a judgment on the fact alone, if the fact is so
connected with others that it form only a portion of the
transaction.'
"It will be noted that the case which is there cited in-
volved contractual transactions,' but there is no distinction
between the rule in such cases and in actions ex delicto ...
"We cannot approve a rule which arbitrarily uses the
element of time in determining whether or not various caus-
es of action arise out of the same 'transaction.' If, as a mat-
ter of fact, there is such a connection that the acts com-
plained of were the results of plaintiff's own acts, we think
all causes of action arising therefrom must be litigated in
one action.'"
=That the word "contract" is used to refer to the negotiations culmin-
ating in the agreement sued upon, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928),
p. 452.
'(1923) 67 Mont. 9, 15, 16, 17, 214 P. 1106. For other Montana cases
dealing with the term "transaction" see Griffiths v. Thrasher, supra,
note 98 (Action to foreclose a chattel mortgage on hotel furniture,
given to secure promissory notes for the balance of the purchase price.
"Cross-complaint" alleging that the sale leading to the execution of
the mortgage was induced by fraudulent representations of the seller
relating to patronage, class of patrons, etc., by reason of which de-
fendant was induced to pay $2500 for the business over and above the
reasonable value, and take a three year lease upon the hotel property
from the owner at a higher rate than the defendant would otherwise
have paid, whereby defendant suffered damages in the sum of $5680,
held to state a claim arising out of the transaction sued upon) ; Kins-
man v. Stanhope (1914) 50 Mont. 41, 144 P. 1083, L. R. A. 1916 C. 443
(Action for conversion of an automobile, plaintiff alleged to have been
entitled to possession by virtue of his purchase of it from defendant.
Counterclaim for balance due on purchase price, held to arise out of
the same transaction, or, at least, to be connected with the subject of
the action) ; James v. Speer (1923) 69 Mont. 100, 220 P. 535 (Action
by mortgagor of personal property against the mortgagee for its con-
version. Counterclaim for balance due on the note secured by the
mortgage after sale at foreclosure, held proper subject of counter-
claim) ; Guthrie v. Holloran, 8upra, note 59 (Action for damages for
conversion of an automobile. Counterclaim, treated as "cross-com-
plaint," for amount due on promissory note executed and delivered on
an exchange of another used automobile for the automobile involved).
Cf. also Boucher v. Powers, supra, note 109; Osmers v. Furey, supra,
note 89, decided before Scott v. Waggoner (Action by lessee of build-
ing against lessor and a sheriff in claim and delivery to recover pos-
session of lodging house furniture and damages for wrongful taking.
Defense: justification of seizure under lien for rent, and counterclaim
for expenditures for repair of building which plaintiff allowed to fall
into disrepair during tenancy. Held, motion to strike should have been
granted because, for one reason, the cause of action alleged in the
counterclaim did not arise out of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint and was not connected with the subject of the action. The
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While such a view of the term "transaction" is much more
liberal than the view of some other courts, yet it would seem that
it is in accord with the purpose of the statute. If multiplicity
of suits is to be avoided, then a group of circumstances which
have a bearing upon one another should be considered as one
transaction.
The meaning of the phrase "subject of the action" has been
the subject of much refinement, and it has been debated wheth-
er it means cause of action, object of action, defendant's
"wrong," plaintiff's "primary right," or the thing involved.'
Much is to be said for the position that the phrase refers to the
thing involved-for the position that when a tangible thing is
involved in the case, the tangible thing is the subject of the ac-
tion; that when the action is on contract and a tangible thing is
not involved, the contract, written or unwritten, is the subject
of the action; and that when the action is in tort and a tangible
thing, including the human body, is not involved, the intangible
thing injured is the subject of the action.' Certain Montana
cases seem to have so treated it.' However, in other cases the
court has expressly stated that the subject of the action does not
relate to the thing itself, but refers to the origin and ground of
court said: "The transaction set forth is the wrongful taking of the
property. While rent due for the use of the premises would have been
a complete justification, the fact that it was due did not arise out of
the wrongful seizure, nor was it in any way connected with it. It was
the result of the breach of the lease, as were all the other items al-
leged as elements for defendant's claim." It is submitted that such a
position would not be taken by the court under the rule of Scott v.
Waggoner and Mulcahy v. Duggan, and that the lease and its breach
was a circumstance connected with the alleged wrongful taking).
'Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes, etc., op. cit., note 120.
'"Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes, etc., op. cit., note 120.
"*Davis v. Frederick, supra, note 121 (In action for wrongful issuance
of an execution upon a judgment and levy upon money, the court said,
"The subject of the action was the money seized under the execution,
and paid to appellant." As, apparently, there was no connection be-
tween the counterclaim, which alleged an indebtedness from plaintiff
to defendant upon an account, and the issuance of the execution and
the levy, what was said would seem to have been obiter dictum);
Davis v. Davis, supra, p. 44 (In holding that the matter alleged by
defendant was connected with the subject of the action and sufficient
as a counterclaim, the court said, "The title to the premises is the
subject of the action"). And cf. Callender v. Crossfield Oil Syndicate,
supra, note 59 (In suit against the owner of an oil and gas lease to
foreclose a mechanic's lien, the subject matter was the leasehold, under
R. C. M. 1935, §9151, dealing with cross-complaints. It is to be noted
that the cross-complaint statute permits relief relating to the "subject
matter upon which the action is brought, or affecting the property to
which the action relates")7
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plaintiff's right to recover and obtain the relief asked for.m
And in Potter v. Lohse, the court quoted with approval a state-
ment of a New York court that: "The words 'subject of the ac-
tion' mean the facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action."'
However, in view of the broad and liberal construction of
"transaction" adopted by the court in Scott v. Waggoner and
Mulcahy v. Duggan, it would seem that abstract definitions of
"subject of the action" are of little importance in results to be
reached; and that in truth there is no definite line of demarca-
tion between "transaction" and "subject of the action,'"" but
rather that "subject of the action" was intended merely to
broaden the term "transaction" and permit the trial in one ac-
tion of controversies with respect to all circumstances which are
so connected or have such a bearing one upon the other"M that it
is just and expedient that they be tried together.'
' Collier v. Ervin, supra, note 80; Pittsmont Copper Co. v. O'Rourke,
supra, note 64 (Suit to enjoin sale of property in execution of judg-
ment. Counterclaim alleging judgment obtained by defendant against
another company and a transfer of the property of that company to
plaintiff to avoid liability to defendant, held proper, the subject of
plaintiff's action being its right as owner to enjoy the property in
question free from the levy complained of, free from the threatened
sale, and free from any claim on the part of defendant by virtue of
his judgment, and the ground for defendant's claim to affirmative re-
lief being his right to make the same levy and sale on execution of the
same judgment. Query: Would not the same result have followed by
treating the subject of the action as the tangible thing, namely, the
property?)
1131 Mont. at p. 97.
'See, for instance, Kinsman v. Stanhope, supra, note 126, 50 Mont. at
p. 46: "defendant's counterclaim arose out of the same transaction, or,
at least, was connected with the subject of the action."
"'In Kaufman v. Cooper, 8upra, note 117, decided prior to Scott v. Wag-
goner, the court said that the requirement that the counterclaim be
"connected with the subject of the action" necessitated a "legal rela-
tionship between the ground of recovery mentioned in the counter-
claim, and the subject of plaintiff's action as disclosed in his com-
plaint." However, the court said that from the record it could not
say what the relationship was, and just what the court meant by
"legal relationship" is not clear. To require a connection in the sense
of immediate and direct, or, in contract cases, such as Kaufman v.
Cooper, to require that it be something the parties contemplated In
their dealings with each other, would seem to be to apply a lawyer's
view, an approach which, as we have seen, the Montana court aban-
doned in Scott v. Waggoner when dealing with the term "transaction."
'"See Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes, etc., op. cit., note 120; Toelle,
Joinder of Actions, 18 CALi. L. Ruv., 459, 474, 477, (1929-30) ; CLARK,
CODH PLFIADING (1928), pp. 453-457. Clark urges that it is not desir-
able to attempt to delimit separately the sphere of each term by ab-
stract definitions, for to do so is to obscure the true function of the
counterclaim which is to enable litigants to settle in one suit as many
controversies as are feasible.
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6. What Constitutes a Contract Counterclaim.
Under the second subdivision of the counterclaim statute, if
the action be on contract a defendant is permitted, but not re-
quired, to set up a counterclaim on contract, although it does not
arise out of the contract sued upon and is not connected with the
subject of the action.' It is clear that this subdivision compre-
hends claims which are unliquidated as well as those which are
liquidated.'. A problem arises, however, as to what causes of
action are to be treated as on contract.
Although in Davis v. Frederick, decided in 1887, the Su-
preme Court of Montana said that the provision of the code in-
tends a cause of action arising ex contractu, and not ex delicto,"'
yet it is established as a general doctrine by the overwhelming
weight of authority that any cause of action which might have
afforded a basis for a claim in express or implied contract prior
to the codes of civil precedure will be treated as a cause of ac-
tion in contract."' And such was the position taken in First Na-
tional Bank of Butte v. Silver.' In that case, in an action upon
a promissory note, the defendant interposed a counterclaim al-
leging that plaintiff wrongfully obtained a check of defendant's,
caused it to be indorsed, presented it to the bank upon which it
was drawn, collected the money, "converted" it to his own use,
and failed to account to the plaintiff for the same. The court
held that by waiving the tort and proceeding as upon the im-
plied contract, defendant could set up the cause of action as a
counterclaim, for subdivision 2 of the statute includes implied
as well as express contracts. It seems, therefore, that Montana
is in accord with the weight of authority, in spite of Davis v.
Frederick.
A question of more doubt is whether the election to sue in
contract must be indicated in the pleading itself." It is to be
observed that in First National Bank of Butte v. Silver the court
was not deterred from treating the counterclaim as on contract
by reason of the fact that the defendant alleged that the plain-
tiff "converted" the property. However, in Davis v. Frederick,
8'Of course, the first subdivision of the statute applies if plaintiff's
cause of action and defendant's counterclaim arise out of the same
contract, and in such a case defendant must urge his claim as a coun-
terclaim or be barred from enforcing it in a subsequent separate suit.
Supra, pp, 39, 61.
'"PomEBoY, CODE REMEmIs (5th ed. 1929), §674; CLA K, CODE PIMA ING
(1928), p. 458.
'Supra, note 121.
'MPOMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §677; CLAR x, CODE PLEADING
(1928), p. 460.
'mupra, note 81.
"PomERoY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929), §677.
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the action was to recover on account of the wrongful issuance of
an execution upon a judgment previously recovered against the
plaintiff; and the plaintiff alleged that the judgment had been
satisfied before the execution was issued, that the execution was
levied upon the property of plaintiff, the same being money in
the hands of the sheriff, and paid to the defendant upon the ex-
ecution, and he claimed judgment for the amount seized and
paid over, with interest. In holding that the complaint set forth
an action in tort and not on contract, so that a contract counter-
claim not connected with the subject matter was not available,
the court said:
"... It is true, the respondent might have waived the
wrongful issuance of the execution, and brought his action
upon the implied contract to repay the money wrongfully
seized and paid over under the execution, or, as the expres-
sion would have been before the adoption of the code,
waived the tort, and sued in assumpsit; but this is not a
question of what might have been done, but of what, in fact,
was done. We must look to the pleadings as we find
them.... ","
It is not apparent why any different rule should be applied
in testing the character of plaintiff's cause of action than in
testing the character of defendant's counterclaim, unless it be
that a defendant by the very fact of urging his claim as a coun-
terclaim rather than in a separate suit evidences his election to
waive the tort and sue in contract, whereas the only way in
which a plaintiff can indicate his election is in the manner in
which he phrases his pleading. However, to construe the statute
so as to permit a plaintiff to control the use of a counterclaim
by the manner in which he casts his pleading does not promote
the purpose to prevent multiplicity of suits. And it would seem
to be more consistent with a system of code pleading, under
which the legal principle upon which a party bases his cause of
action is not expressed and the statement of the facts constitut-
ing a cause of action is the heart of the pleading, to permit the
counterclaim in any case where the allegations of facts in the
plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's answer are such that
they could have been cast as an action on contract and a counter-
claim on contract, irrespective of the way in which the allega-
tions are in fact phrased.
As the contract counterclaim may be an unliquidated claim,
there may be a tendency to limit the statutory provision because
of possible burdens at trial incidental to liquidation-a burden
106 Mont. 300, 302.
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not compensated for by the advantage gained through trying in
one suit claims arising out of one transaction.'" However, if in
any case the application of the statute does prove to be unduly
burdensome, the Montana statutes contain provisions for direc-
tion by the court, in its discretion, of a separate trial of issues.'"
It is submitted that inconvenience of trial should be taken care
of by ordering separate trial, rather than by a judicial construc-
tion of the statute which limits the filing of counterclaims.
III. ADVANCED PROCEDURE AND CONCLUSION
Since 1873 the English counterclaim procedure has been far
in advance of the practice under American codes such as that
existing in Montana. The English rules of court provide that
the defendant may counterclaim any right or claim, but the
court may, on the application of the plaintiff before trial, if in
the opinion of the court such counterclaim cannot be convenient-
ly disposed of in the pending action, or ought not to be allowed,
refuse permission to the defendant to avail himself thereof.'"
Under these rules any or all defendants may counterclaim
against any or all plaintiffs;'" it is not necessary that the coun-
terclaim tend to diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery, or arise
out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim, or be in any way
connected with it, or that it exist at the time of the commence-
ment of the action.1"
In the United States, statutes in several of the states have
for a number of years contained advanced procedure for the in-
terposition of cross-demands. The Arkansas and New Jersey
statutes permit as a counterclaim any cause of action in favor of
any defendant, and provide for the bringing in of new parties
and the ordering of separate trials or actions in the discretion of
the court ;" and the Iowa code permits the defendant to counter-
claim any cause of action which he has against the plaintiff and
which is matured when pleaded." More recently Illinois and
'"CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 458.
"R. C. M. 1935, § §9328, 9329.
'"ENo. Jun. AcT., Order 19, rule 3.
'0Hodson v. Mochi (1878) 8 Ch. D. 569; Manchester & Sheffield Rail.
Co. v. Brooks (1877) 2 Ex. Div. 243.
"Bartholomew v. Rawlings (1876) W. N. 56; Beddal v. Maitland (1881)
17 Ch. Div. 174, 181, 182; Stooke v. Taylor (1880) 5 Q. B. Div. 569,
576.
"'ARK. Acts 1917, p. 1441, DiG. STATS. OF ARx. (1937) Ch. 22, §§1417,
1418, 1419; N. J. P. L. 1912, p. 379, §12, N. J. S. A. 2:27-137, 139, 141.
'"IA. CODE (1927) §11151, subd. 1. See also the change in California in
1927, abolishing the limitations that the counterclaim must arise out
of the transaction set forth in the complaint or be connected with the
subject matter of the action, and that a contract counterclaim must
exist at the commencement of the action. CALIr. STATS. & AmDTS.
(1927), p. 1620.
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New York have extended their practice acts to liberalize the use
of cross-demands. The new Practice Act of Illinois provides
that any demand by any defendant against any plaintiff or any
co-defendant may be pleaded in a cross-demand in any action ;'
and the New York Laws of 1936 provide that "a counterclaim
may be any cause of action in favor of the defendants or some
of them against the plaintiffs or some of them, a person whom
a plaintiff represents or a plaintiff and another person or per-
sons alleged to be liable.'"'a
When it came to the formulation of the new federal rules of
civil procedure the existing advanced procedure in England and
the United States furnished a model for permissive counter-
claim, and, in furtherance of the purpose to prevent multiplicity
of suits, provision was also made for compulsory counterclaim.
The rules provide that any claim which any defendant has at
the time of filing his pleading against any plaintiff, arising out
of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the plaintiff's claim, must be set up as a counterclaim or it is
waived; and that any defendant may state as a counterclaim any
claim against any plaintiff not arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim. It is not necessary that the counterclaim diminish or de-
feat the recovery sought by the plaintiff, but a defendant may
claim relief of a different kind from that sought by the plaintiff.
The counterclaim need not have been acquired or matured for
action before the commencement of the suit, and, with the per-
mission of the court, a claim which either matures or is acquired
by the defendant after serving his pleading may be presented.
Additional parties may be brought in, and there may be separate
trials and judgments.'
Tlhus the advanced procedure abolishes the limitations that
the counterclaim be one in favor of a defendant between whom
and the plaintiff a separate judgment may be had, that it tend
to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery, that it exist at the
commencement of the action, and that it either be a contract
counterclaim or arise out of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint or be connected with the subject matter of the action.
Surely the question of the extent to which procedural rec-
ognition should be given to cross-demands should no longer be
approached in the failing light of common law recoupment and
statutory set-off of English origin. If the purpose is to enable
"ILL. LAws 1933, p. 784; SMITH-HURl), IL. ANN. STAT. (permanent ed.)
ch. 110, §162, subd. 1.
"'N. Y. LAWS 1936, ch. 324; CAHu.Ls N. Y. Civ. PRAC. (7th ed.), §266.
'Rules 13 and 42(b).
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parties litigant to adjust their differences in one action and to
prevent the multiplicity of suits, the new federal rules of civil
procedure are logical; and economy of the time of the courts, of
public funds, and of both the time and the money of the parties
litigant, should be practiced so far as trial convenience and jus-
tice permits, irrespective of whether in any given jurisdiction
there is a greater or lesser degree of congestion of commercial
and legal business. It is true that under the advanced proced-
ures incongruous counterclaims may be interposed, and differ-
ent questions of fact may be presented requiring different modes
of trial; but there is nothing in such a situation to defeat either
trial convenience or justice to the parties, so long as the court
has the discretionary power to order separate trials, for surely
a court which is entrusted to try both questions of fact and law
may be entrusted to order separation, not only when its own con-
venience will be promoted but also when necessary in fairness
and justice to the parties.'
It may be expected that there will be an increase in the num-
ber of states which, in adopting rules or statutes patterned after
the federal rules of civil procedure, will include the provisions
of the federal rules with respect to counterclaims, as Arizona "
and Coloradotm have already done.' And may it not be expect-
tThe interposition of an "equitable" counterclaim in an action "at law,"
or vice versa, does not present a new problem, for R. C. M. 1935, §9146,
already permits such incongrous defenses, and there need be no diffi-
culty in working out the form of trial Parties may waive jury trial;
or the court may choose to have the equitable issues tried to the jury
also and send the entire case to the jury; or the court may hear the
equitable issues along with consideration of the legal issues by the
jury, the resulting judgment proper on the various findings of fact to
be entered by the court; or the trial of equitable issues may be had
to the court entirely apart from the trial of jury issues. CLARK, CODE
PLEADING (1928), p. 64.
"ARI. CoDE ANN. 1939 (official ed.) ch. 21, §§437-445.
mRules 13 and 42(b), R. C. P. CoLO. (effective Ap. 1941).
100 f course, this study is of but a small segment of the rules of trial
practice, a simplification of which, patterned after the federal rules
of civil procedure should proceed apace. As said by Hon. John T.
Parker, chairman, Special Committee on Improving the Administra-
tion of Justice, American Bar Association:
"..... Arizona and South Dakota have adopted the new federal
rules almost in toto. Texas has adopted a simplified code based
in large measure on the rules and Colorado has done a monumental
work In adopting the federal rules with the same numbering, sup-
plemented by such additional rules as are required by local condi-
tions. In many other states features of the federal practice, such
as discovery, pre-trial, etc., are being adopted. . . . It Is highly de-
sirable that such procedure be modeled on the federal rules. There
is absolutely no sense in having a different kind of procedure in
the state and federal courts or in different sections of the country.
Diversity makes for confusion and misunderstanding and accom-
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ed that courts will in some degree reflect the tendency toward
unrestricted cross-demands by a more liberal construction of the
statutory limitations in states retaining the old procedure? May
it not be expected that the Montana court, having shown com-
mendable liberality in its determination of what constitutes a
transaction counterclaim, will re-examine other limitations
placed upon counterclaims under R. C. M. 1935, Section 9138?
plishes no good purpose. When a simple, expeditious system has
been adopted by the federal courts for use throughout the country,
I see no reason why the states should not adopt it and relieve the
bar of the necessity of learning two systems of practice. The fed-
eral rules are the result of long study and the best efforts of the
bench and bar of the entire country..... ".27 A. B. A. J. 748
(Dec. 1941).
40
Montana Law Review, Vol. 3 [1942], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/12
